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1Simulation of Learning in Supply Partnerships
Gábor Péli and Bart Nooteboom*
SOM theme B: Inter-firm coordination and change
Abstract
A model is designed and used to simulate how partners in a supply relationship identify
and reach a common target in the form of an ideal end prouct. They cooperate fully and
share returns. They learn by interaction, as follows. From their differen  pe spectives, they
complement each other's identification of the target. They adapt their productive compe-
tencies to the target, in order to conform to demand (quality), and to each oter, in order to
achieve efficient complementarity in production (efficiency). As they approach the target,
their accuracy of identifyi g the target increases. Also, their speed of adaptati n increases,
and thus they can be said to be learning by doing. The model allows two different patterns
of acceleration: a routine and a radical type of development. At some distance from the tar-
get they start to produce. A longer distance from the target yields earlier returns, but also
entails a greater compro ise on quality and ther by yields lower returns. Unpredictable
changes in market and technology yield random shifts of the targ t. In the analysis, the
returns from single and dual sourcing are compared under different par meter settings.
The simulations show that in line with expectations dual sourcing can be more advantage-
ous if development is of the radical type. However, th  advantage only arises if conditions
of market and technology are neither too volatile nor too stable.
Keywords: inter-organizational relations, adaptive learning, simulation models,
subcontracting
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21. Introduction
Developments in technology and global markets h ve accelerated, and this has
increasingly turned competition into a race in innovation and market penetration. In
order to stand a chance in these races, to achieve rapid switches to novel
opportunities and conditions, and to deal with increasing complexity, fir s must
concentrate on core competencies (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). This entails the ne d
to outsource activities, even when they are strategic in the sense that they have a
large share in costs, are sensitive to quality and entail specific competencies. Rather
than claiming to have full competence in all dimensions of their products and
production processes, firms should make use of the specific competencies of
suppliers, not only in production, but also in the process of research and deve-
lopment. Rather than making blueprints of required inputs that are "thrown over the
wall" to suppliers, there should be early supplier involvement in the design process
(Helper, 1991; Lamming, 1993). Supply relations must be managed to yield both
high product quality, in a close fit to market requirements, and low-cost, efficient
production. This requires supply relationships i  which partners utilize comple-
mentarities in perception of market demands and technical competencies, and adapt
to each others' competencies in design and production.
Often, from the perspective of transaction cost economics (TCE), studies have
concentrated on the problems of mutual dependence ("hold-up") as a result of trans-
action specific investments, which raise complicated issues of governance of
relations between formally independent but materially dependent firms, in forms of
organization "between market and hierarchy" (Will amson, 1985). This certainly
forms an important issue, which deserves all the attention it has received. For a
recent model of governance that proposes an integrated framework, including
elements from outside TCE (such as trust next to opportunism, see Nooteboom,
1996a). But in the context set out above, innovation and learning form  crucial
3dimension of supply relations, and TCE does not deal with it, as Williamson (1985)
himself admitted1 (Nooteboom, 1992).
Our basic purpose is to develop a better understanding of the conditions that
determine whether single or multiple sourcing is better in supply partner hips, while
focusing not on issues of governance but on issues of learning and innovation in the
interaction between buyer and supplier(s). In order to limit the complexity of the
model, we assume that issues of governance are taken care of in such a way (for
example: by symmetry of mutual dependence) that cooperation in a long term
relation is ensured.2
The perspective on knowledge (epistemology) that we take can be characterized
as pragmatist and social constructivist (Nooteboom, 1992, 1996b). Pragmatist in the
tradition of American pragmatism (Peirce 1957) that knowledge (on the level of both
people and organizations) is seen as the ability to perform a practice, and adequacy
of knowledge is judged by the success of performance. Social constructivist in the
sense that cognitive competencies such as perception, und rstanding and evaluation
are based on categories that are developed in interaction with the world and parti-
cularly with other agents. As a result, cognitive competencies are path-dependent and
to some extent idiosyncratic: different agents perceive, interpret and evaluate the
world differently to the extent that they have had different experiences, in different
contexts. This perspective highlights the importance of cognitive complemenarities
between different agents. Thus learning is seen here as an adaptation of cognitive
and productive competencies to goals, on the basis of experience in applying those
                                            
 1 Williamson (1985: 143-144): ".. the study of economic organization in a regime of rapid
innovation poses much more difficult issues than those addressed here ... New hybrid
forms of organization may appear in response to such a condition ... Much more study of
the relations between organization and innovation is needed".
2 Factors that influence the fate and success of cooperati n are too numerous to be included
in the present model. The more aspects a simulation model incorporates, the bigger is the
chance that the superposition of effects produce output hardly distinguishable from grey
noise. In our view, the main obstacles for building and handling sopisticated models are
not computational, but rather evaluational. The researchers may run into problems when
interpreting the simulation, high complexity may have a negative effect on construct
validity (Burton and Obel, 1995).
4competencies (learning by doing) and interaction with other agents (learning by
interaction).
We want to model radical uncertainty, in the sense that agents (people and firms)
have a limited cognitive capacity: they can only perceive, interpret and evaluate a
limited range of phenomena. In line with our epistemological perspective, to a
greater or lesser extent they do so differently from others (Dearborn and Simon,
1958; Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky; Walker, 1985). Organizations may react to
uncertainty in several ways. For example, they may try to seal off, smoothen or
buffer external influences (Thompson, 1967; Pólos, 1995). They may bet on gene-
ralism (Freeman and Hannan, 1983; Péli, 1997) or follow an "r-strategy" going for
short term advantages (Brittain and Freeman, 1980). In cooperative relations, firms
may try to increase their engagement in their existing exchange relations or look for
new partners with similar status (Podolny, 1994).
Uncertainty is reduced by learning in two ways: learning by doing and learning
by interacting. In line with our epistemology, learning by doing entails that one
improves task perception, and the ability to produce in accordan e with it, by
accumulating experience in striving after one’s goal. Learning by interacting profits
from the complementarity of the different perspective and competence of a partner
(Hakansson, 1986). Both processes entail not only information acquisition, but also
adaptation of cognitive and productive compet n ies.
We consider two kinds of organizational agents that join their efforts to develop
and produce a new product. The first agent is the user who decides what to produce,
and in view of its core competenc  (and trans ction cost considerations) decides
which part to produce itself and which part to obtain from suppliers. To limit com-
plexity, we assume a single product. The user looks for partners who can provide or
develop the missing competencies (Schrader, 1991). The second kind of agent is the
supplier that joins the user. Suppliers have more specialized knowledge and
competencies than the user concerning the required input materials, components,
technol gy and methods, but these need to be adjusted to the purpose of cooperation
with the user. This entails specific investments, but we assume that the resulting
complications for governance are taken care of so that full and ongoing c operation
is ensured. The user has a certain capacity to absorb inputs from suppliers (Cohen
and Levinthal, 1990).
5The non-trivial task of selecting appropriate partners (Hamel, 1991; Teece, 1986) is
beyond the scope of the present simulation. Our story begins when the market, the
product to be developed and the cooperative relation are already given and partners
set to work.
We assume that there is an imperfectly perceived optimal competence set for the
manufacturing of user's chosen product, given technology and market structure.3 A
product “distant” from a supplier in terms of the required proucti n skills is
perceived less accurately than a “proximate” one. The goal for the suppliers is to
achieve the competence configuration ideal for the production of the given product.
As suppliers adapt, i.e. they bring closer their actual competence offer to the ideal,
their knowledge on the location of the optimum gradually improves (learning by
doing). Meanwhile, the user has to bring its absorptive capacity close to the actual
skill offer of the supplier (learning by interaction). When getting closer to the
optimal competence configuration, the quality of the product improves. Here quality
is literally taken according to the definition of quality as conformance to
requirements of demand. When user and supplier get closer to each oth , th
efficiency of production improves due to better mutual adjustment. Thus we model
the three central goals required by competitive conditions: utilization of
complementary core competencies, high product quality and low-cost, efficient
production.
A crucial feature of the model is the possibility of using not one but muliple
suppliers with specializations in different directions, thus increasing the variety of
sources (Nonaka, 1991; Nooteboom, 1992). Attacking the problem with two or more
cooperating suppliers with different perspectives and competencies enhances the
accuracy of their joint perception. Also, a specialized supplier can adapt more
quickly to the perceived goal in the direction of its specialization. A further
                                            
3 Here, the meaning of market structure is that of the industrial organization literature
with its traditional perspective of structure, conduct and performance. Thus, rket
structure includes aspects of production technology (economy of scale, scope and
learning), other supply conditis (concentration, vertical integration), demand conditions
(nature of the product with respect to user's ability to judge quality, price elasticity, user
switching costs, differentiability of the product), and strategic conditions (entry barriers,
sunkenness of costs, patentbility of inventions, stage in the product life cycle).
6advantage for the user of having multiple suppliers is dealing with external
turbulence. Turbulence comes into the model as random shifts of the ideal product
requirements (and so, of the corresponding ideal competence configurations) due to
changes in market conditions. By maintaining two, differently positioned suppliers
instead of a single one, the user hedges risks against random shifts in product
requirements. However, the user has to face the trade-off be ween that advantage and
the complication of maintaining relations and making mutual adaptations with
several partners. The model serves to explore the trade-off under different conditions
represented by different parameter settings.
As indicated, we do not include problems of governance due to dependence as a
result of specific investments, on the assumption that they are satisfactorily dealt
with4. But a few remaining strategic aspects of interaction need to be mentioned. One
is that an agent may opportunistically choose to switch to an more attractive patner
that appears on the scene. A partner may also drop from the scene due to bankruptcy
or take-over. Our model does not deal with these issues. Multiple sourcing has the
additional function of hedging against such risks, or improving one's bargaining
position with the threat of switching to an alternative part er. Another aspect is spill-
over: intensive exchange of knowledge between partners carries the risk that through
the partner it may spill over to a competitor (Teece, 1986). This risk increases as the
number of partners increases. We do not model the appearance and disappearance of
actual or potenial partners and processes of switching between them. We only study
the trade-off between single and dual sourcing as a function of the shifts of the goal,
perception of the goal, speed of adaptation to the goal and mutual adaptation
between user and supplier(s). But one point remains: in case of two suppli rs, o
what extent will they be prepared to adapt competencies to a common goal, in the
interest of the user, if this makes them close mutual competitors? There are probably
limits to this: two suppliers will not be prepar d to come closer to each other in
                                            
4 This may be achieved by symmetry of dependence. A simple possibility is that both sides
to the relation are equally unique to each other, have equal stakes in specific ssets and
equal opportunities for monitoring compliance with agreements. If there is asymmetry in
one aspect, it may be compensated in another aspect of governance. For instruments and
processes for achieving symmetry, s e Nooteboom (1996a); for different outcomes under
different market conditions, see Nooteboom (1997).
7competence than some minimal distance. The effect of this restriction is considered
in the appendix.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is about model construction: how
some crucial elements of joint production and mutual adaptation are represented in
the simulation model, the motivations for certain technical solutions, what has been
left out or simplified. Model construction is based on an initial design by Nooteboom
(1994, 1995). Section 3 offers the simulation results. Three hypotheses are
formulated that are plausible under certain ceteris paribus conditions. The simula-
tions show what comes out if we let conditions vary and interact, for different
parameter settings. Section 4 provides a discussion and summary of the findings.
2. Model Specification
2.1 The Scenery
This first subsection provides a picture which is still static: it serves to specify how
the agents and their targets are represented in space.
The model is set up on the basis of movements in a Euclidean space, called
competence space. Learning is seen as such changes of competence. Since we look at
outsourcing, the dimensions of the competence space stand for the outsourced
production competencies that the user needs to obtain from suppliers. To keep the
representation simple and to be able to plot movements visually, the model handles
two competence dimensions. We assume an ideal poi t (IP) in the competence
space, which represents the ideal competence configuration for the product that user
intends to manufacture in cooperation with supplier(s). This competence set is
necessary to achieve the optimal product specifica ions, that is, to produce maximal
quality. Since the same output may be produced by different underlying technologies
that require somewhat different combinations of competence, a given product may in
principle have multiple ideal points in the competen e s ace (or in different, partly
overlapping competence spaces). To limit complexity, we assume a single ideal point
at each time step.
8Changes of technology and other features of market conditions are modeled by ideal
point shifts: new technologies and products usually require new configurations f
competence. We model cases when the change is punctuated: technological
breakthroughs or market changes occur suddenly after relatively quiet periods.
Therefore, a parameter is introduced that measures the elapsed time between
subsequent ideal point shifts, reflecting market stability (Mstab). Since market
conditions are assumed to be externally given, Mstab is an independent variable in
the model.
Organizational agents are characterized by the actual competence configuration
they possess. A supplier position in space (S) indicates its competence to produce a
certain input for the user. The user's position (U) indicates its competence to absorb
the input offered by the supplier (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). The joint goal of user
and supplier is to minimize the Euclidean distances between the ideal point and the
supplier(s) (to achieve optimal quality), and also between the user and its supplier(s)
(to achieve efficient production).
Some assumptions concerning competencies are implied in the chosen Euclid an
framework. First, the fact that competence types are represented as orthogonal axes
of the space implies that the skills are independe t from each other, a condition not
always met in reality. A second assumption follows from the isotropy of Euclidean
space: there is no preference for directions. A consequen e of this property is that
higher competence values are not necessarily b tter. The ideal point of the product
represents the optimal set of competence values, and overshoot is as bad as shortfall.
For some products an overshoot is indeed bad: a coat can be too long, a drink too
sweet, a car too large. But what is the problem with too high competencies? If a
smart operator can produce well, a smarter operator can produce superbly. But the
maintenance of high competence levels carries a cost. Beyond a certain limit, more
competence does not improve duct quality enough to counterbalance extra invest-
ments in skill improvement. Note that a similar practice is used in the so-called
address type models of product differentiation in the industrial organization literature
(Eaton and Lipsey, 1989). There demand of a consumer i  represented as a point in a
Lancasterian product characteristics space, which is also Euclidean.
92.2 Movement
This subsection is about dynamics: our agents and targets move, representing adap-
tive efforts and market change, respectively.
Each agent follows an adaptive path to fit competencies to the target. Two
aspects of cooperation that influence the outcome are addressed. The distance
between the agents and the ideal point (IP) in competence space serves as a measure
of product quality; the distance between user (U) and supplier (S) serves as a
measure of ef iciency of production, since it reflects the mismatch between supplier's
ability to produce an input and user's ability to absorb it. When S reaches IP’s
position along a dimension of competence, this means that the optimal degree of
competence along that dimension has been achieved. Proximity between S's
competence offer and U's receptive ability means good mutual fit, which enhances
efficiency. Goal perception depends on distance: the closer is an agent to its goal in a
dimension, the more accurately it perceives the goal's position on that dimension.
Being in the space of outsourced competencies, the ideal point’s position is
characterized with supplier skills. It is the supplier's task to figure out the IP
coordinates in the outsourced dimensions, and to approach them. User's job is to
bring its absorptive competence close to S's productive competence position. U may
opt for different adaptive strategies. It may give preference to rapid improvements in
cooperation and approach S immediately. Then, user follows a moving target,
namely, the actual supplier coordinates. Then distance between the partners may
reduce rapidly, but U moves along a detour of mutual adaptation before all partners
end up at IP. Alternatively, U can move towards IP directly, anticipating that S will
arrive there as well. Then, priority is given to minimalization of detours, with the
disadvantage of a slower improvement of cooperation. Intuition suggests that the
latter option is superior, and some preliminary test runs confirmed this intuition.
Therefore, the following simulations go on with a user that approaches its supplier
by moving towards IP, in anticipation of S's getting there as well.
Now we consider how agents’ adaptive speeds change as they approach their
targets. Since movement is a vector, with direction and length, the positive effects of
agents' improving task perception on performance are twofold. The first concerns
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spatial orientation. Having a clear picture of the target allows for moving straight
towards its de facto position.5 The precision of perception is modeled by the width of
an error range around the goal on each competence dimension. Being a linear
function of the distance from the goal, the perception error decreases to zero as
agents approach their targets. As a result, the zigzags of the adaptive path gradually
smoothen out. Task perception is re-evaluated after each simulation step.
Technically, the target’s perceiv d position is randomly given within the (narrowing)
error range. 
Second, the magnitude of adaptive speed also reflects agents’ perception. Actors
cannot change their competencies arbitrarily rapidly. But possessing precise task
information makes the adjustment faster. In model terms: adaptive movements
accelerate with the agents getting closer to their targets. The pattern of acceleration
depends on the novelty of the product under development. Two acceleration patterns
were studied that reflect different dynamics of competence adaptation (learning).
Let's call them routine type and eureka type development patterns, respectively:
refinement of an existing technology or invention of a new one (Levinthal and
March, 1981). Or in other words: cumulative versus radical innovation.
A routine type development pattern involves a task where competence deve-
lopment is gradual and cumulative. The resulting product is an enhanced version of
similar ones that have been manufactured before. Think of a new model of a
successful family car or a new version of a text editor software. There are no or only
few brand new technological elements in the R&D process. The outcomes of the
R&D are to a large extent predictable; the adjustment process is gradual and subject
to reliable timing. In model terms: adaptive speed increases linearly as the agent
approaches its goal (Figure 1a).
An eureka type development pattern is about the construction of a brand new
product or production technology that constitutes a break with respect to previous
practice. Uncertainty is high, the research begins "in the dark". Think of a car with a
new type of propulsion principle, or a new generation computer operation system.
The beginning is slow because there is less to build on. But after an incubation, a
breakthrough occurs, and once one has a grip on the subject, task knowledge grows
                                            
5 Unless other considerations suggest different trajectory (see in 2.3).
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rapidly, without delays due to the need to maintain continuity with previous practice.
Speed increases slowly far from IP, and but increases steeply near the target
(Figure 1b).
Figure 1. Patterns of Adaptive Speed Change















The distinction between the two development patterns can be seen as differ nt
positions along the exploration/exploitation trade-off (March, 1996): exploration
dominates in the eureka type developments, while the exploitation of mains ream
methods and technologies prevails in routine developments.
2.3 Diversity
Having the actors and their movements, now the trade-off is introduced between
having one or more suppliers. A crucial question is addressed: how to represent the
beneficial effects for the cooperation of having more diversity of competence by
having not one but two suppliers, and how to account for the drawbacks arising from
coordination in such triads.
This setting requires some new denotations. In the following, U denotes a user
with a single supplier S, and U12 denotes a user with two suppliers, S1 andS2.
Similarly, let C and C12 denote the cooperation with one and with two suppliers,
respectively.
Multiple sourcing may be superior to single sourcing for several reasons. Here,
we focus on the consideration that the abilities nd task perceptions of the
contributors differ, yielding wider information diversity. The question is whether the
beneficial effects counterbalance the costs of obtaining and processing the more
diverse information, and accomplishing mutual adaptation between three instead of
two agents.
Now two suppliers, S1 and S2, have to provide the necessary complementary
competencies for user U12 to manufacture a product (IP). Both suppliers have to
adjust their competencies to IP, hat is, they have to identify and approach the IP
coordinates. How can one represent the effect of greater information diversity
resulting from the different angles from which a target is approached? In a spatial
framework, a feasible solution is to assign different adaptive trajectories to S1 and S2.
We assume a systematic difference in suppliers' developmental orientation. Although
their objective is to adjust all of their competencies to IP, th y are biased in skill
development; they specialize in adjustment of one skill relative to the other. In
simulation terms, adaptation on the specialized competence dim nsion is
13
systematically faster. Consequently, the suppliers' routes toward IP will differ, even
in case of a common departure point (Figure 2a-b).











(a) Single Supplier (b) Two Suppliers
Let S1 be special zed in adaptation along competence x, while S2 is better in
developing competence y. These specializations are represented by higher adaptive
speed components along the pertaining dimensions. In mathematical terms, each sup-
plier’s speed vector is decomposed unevenly to horizontal and vertical components.
The ratio of the two components (vx : vy) serves as a measure of specialization. In
the given case, we set 2 : 1 for S1 and 1 : 2 for S2. As a consequence, S1 and S2 do not
approach the ideal point directly, but they make detours. These detours stand for
extra coordination efforts under specialization. Note that while suppliers specialize
in one dimension, they still have to mutually adapt in the other dimension.
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The advantages of multiple supply are modeled as follows. S1 has a good chance to
approach the ideal point early on dimension x a d to provide precise data on IPx.
Similarly, S2 will typically serve reliable estimates on IPy. F cusing search efforts on
one direction enhances adaptation speed along the pertaining competence. We model
full cooperation where partners disclose all relevant information to each other. So,
S1, S2 and also their user can use the best available estimate on IP's position at each
simulation step. Moreover, if a supplier is temporarily inactive, then the other may
partially take over its task in supplying inputs to the user. The negative side of
multiple sourcing comes in the form of adaptive detours (Figure 2b). These bypasses
represent the costs of specialization. Moreover, it is difficult for U12 to adapt to
suppliers of different inclinations simultaneously; the bigger the difference between
S1 and S2, the more problematic to cooperate with both of them. Having only a single
supplier yields less varied knowledge but fewer troubles of adaptation.
2.4 Profits
The three previous subsections specified the actors, their movements and the role of
diversity. The last step in the construction of the model is to specify the net outcome
of revenues and costs, in a profit function. As in real life, the best choice (having one
or two suppliers) depends on a set of conditions.
The magnitude of profit achieved in cooperati n varies with time: some coop-
erations set off production early, yielding an early stream of profits, while others
start production only after longer preparations, bu  then achieve a higher rate of
profits. The performance of a partnership can be correctly evaluated only by taking
into account cumulative profit, i.e., the summation of profit over a sufficiently long
time period. Therefo , we measured success by the accumulated profit that a
cooperation achieved during the whole time span of the simulation. The relative suc-
cess of the two cooperation forms is measured by the ratio of accumulated C12 and C
profits (Profit ratio): if the variable Profit ratio > 1 then multiple sourcing C12 is
superior, while values less than 1 indicate that single sourcing C is better.
The profit during periods of production is the product of two factors. One
represents quality: the fit of competencies used with the optimal competenc es
15
required. This component decreases linearly with the distance between S and IP. The
second factor represents the efficiency of production: are productive competencies
properly aligned? This component decreases linearly with the distance between U
and S. The multiplicative specification of the profit function reflects a crucial
assumption: none of the partners can produce the end product o  its wn, and close
mutual fit of competence (efficiency) alone is not enough for success. On the other
hand, a close fit to market requirements (quality) alone is not enough either. High
quality at zero efficiency is as useless as high efficiency at zero quality. The profit
rate is normed to be unity at its maximu , i.e. when both U and S positions coincide
with IP (Figure 3). To make single and multiple sourcing comparable, we assume
that the profit rate of dual sourcing is the mean of the rates of the two component
cooperations, U12-S1 and U12-S2.
Production and sales usually start later than the cooperation itself: partners do not
release a product until being sufficiently close to the goal of quality. The model assu-
mes no contribution to production from a supplier that stays beyond a certain
maximum tolerance distance (Tdist=10) from the ideal point: then quality is too low.
Moreover, when U is farther from S than Tdist, then efficiency is too low to produce.
An advantage of dual supply is that production capacity can be partially taken over
from an inactive supplier by the active one. Due to switching costs and costs of
maladaptation, substitution is not perfect; the proportion of transfer decreases
linearly with increasing distance between S1 and S2.
Note that if we assume a single producing agent instead of separate suppliers and
user (no outsourcing), then we are back at the so called "first mover versu  efficient
producer" dilemma (Williamson, 1975; Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Péli and Ma-
such, 1997). First movers are characterized by early production involvement (high
Tdist), which slow down their adaptive speed. Efficient producers begin production
only after achieving a better fit of skills (low Tdist), maintaining a high adaptive
speed for a longer period of time.
The degree of market stability (Mstab) represents the speed of environmental
change. This degenerat d version of the model reproduces Hannan and Freeman's
basic claim, namely that first movers are better if environmental change is rapid,
while slow change favors efficient producers (Péli and Nooteboom, 1995).
16
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denote, respectively, the ideal point positions in the [0; 40) and [40; 80) time intervals.
or from each
IP1 IP2and
Zero profit is produced in [0,10] and in [40; 45], because agents are farther fromIP
Tdist.other than
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3. The Model At Work6
3.1 Cooperation with Single and with Multiple Suppliers
We offer three crude hypotheses on the relative success of C and C12. They are crude
in the sense that they indicate how single parameters of the model affect relative
success, under ceteris paribus conditions (other parameters remaining the same).
These hypotheses express common sense knowledge in the economic and organi-
zation science literature. The reader may ask why we make such extensive efforts to
model evident truths. The answer is that a priori it is hard to predict the interaction
effects: what happens if we vary the parameters simultan ou ly. The simulation
takes into account opposing tendencies: some favor single supply while others favor
dual supply. The question is that what happens when we mix them?
Hypothesis 1 is about the effect of the two development patterns on success.
Routine development does benefit much from extra information diversity; eureka
type, radical innovation does.
Hypothesis 1. Routine development tasks favor single supply, eureka type
developments favor dual supply.
The second hypothesis is about the effects of market stability (Ms ab). Information
acquisition is especially important if market conditions are volatile. Multiple
suppliers provide bigger information diversity, so:
Hypothesis 2. Rapidly changing market conditions favor multiple supply, slow
market change favors single supply.
                                            
6 We applied the Macintosh version of the Stella II software (1992) for simulation. The
code is available upon request from the authors. Having  5000 simulation steps, the
running time was about five minutes at each parameter setting on a Macintosh Quattro
computer.
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The third hypothesis is about the effect of early versus late production. Strict
tolerance limits (low Tdist) pose strict quality and efficiency requirements as a
precondition for the beginning of production. In case of dual sourcing, there is a
bigger chance that at least one supplier meets the strict produc  requirements to offer
sufficient quality. On the other hand, to improve efficiency is more difficult in C12,
because user may have to adjust to remote partners. If Tdis  is large, then production
can begin early, even when S1 a d S2 are diverging (Figure 2b), causing a relative
disadvantage for C12. Therefore:
Hypothesis 3. Loose production requirements favor single supply, tight
requirements favor dual supply.
Now how about mixing these effects? What outcome should one expect, for
example, in case of routine development tasks with rapidly changing market
conditions? Then, Hypothesis 1 suggests that C is better, while Hypothesis 2 predicts
C12's superiority. The simulation runs suggest answers to these questions, clarifying
the interplay of opposing effects that shape the fortune of the two supply forms. The
findings are listed in Table 1.





+ - + -
- - + +
- - + -
      0 - 20                   30      40 -60
     Mstab
   extremely            modestly         slow
rapid change      rapid change          change
Table 1: The Summary of Simulation Results
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We conducted a series of sensitivity analyses with the variables mentioned in the
hypotheses: development pattern, market stability and minimum production
requirements. To achieve reasonably stable results, we employed rather long runs:
5000 simulation steps for each parameter combination. Simulation steps represent
elementary time intervals. After each step, agents update their knowledge on the
location of the ideal point and move into the direction of their perceived goals in the
next step. To make the comparison of results easier, the ideal point, the suppliers and
the users had, respectively, the same initial positions at each run. The random walk
of the ideal point was also the same at each sensitivity analysis run.
3.1.1 Routine Type Development
Table 2 presents the sensitivity run data, and Figure 4 plots the results in a three
dimensional diagram for routine type developments. Single sourcing C is uperior
(Profit ratio < 1) at all parameter settings. However, the gap between the
performance of C and C12 strongly varies with the frequency of market change. C is
much better if  Mstab is low (10), because then S1 a d S2 do not have enough time to
achieve high speed, the bonus for their detours (Figure 2b). C12's disadvantage
gradually lessens as market conditions get more stable. Note that a very high
stability in conditions (M tab = 60) minimizes the winner's advantage, whoever it is,
because finally all agents approach the goal and reach close to maximum profit. The
longer this maximum production state persists, the smaller the effect of the initial
adaptation period on the outcome. Therefore, Profit ratio converges to unity
(Table 2).
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Table 2: Profit Ratios, Routine Development Task
Mstab
Tdist 10 20 30 40 50 60
5 0.75 0.77 0.85 0.96 0.93 0.95
10 0.55 0.75 0.82 0.88 0.92 0.94
15 0.6 0.73 0.80 0.87 0.90 0.92
20 0.67 0.69 0.78 0.86 0.90 0.92
25 0.7 0.69 0.77 0.85 0.89 0.91
30 0.72 0.69 0.77 0.85 0.89 0.91
Mstab
Tdist















Figure 4: Routine Development Task
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These outcomes support Hypothesis 1: having multiple suppliers for the same task is
not a good strategy in routine product development. Then, extra knowledge is not
that important, therefore the disadvantages of having two partners with different
specializations outweigh the benefits of having extra information. The claim that
information acquisition is not crucial in routine problems has not much novelty.
However, the fact that the model provides appropriate predictions in well-understood
cases may increase the confidence in its reliability when less straightforward results
obtain.
Dual supply is especially useless when market conditions are volatile (Mstab =
10), and 's extra search efforts have no time to reach results: Hypothesis 2 is falsified
in case of routine development tasks.
Tdist (the minimally required distance from optimal production) has a weak influ-
ence on the results: C12's relative performance improves with 5-10% as the tolerance
limit becomes more strict. This finding is in line with Hypothesis 3, but the effect is
not strong enough to yield a clear justification (Table 1).
3.1.2 Eureka Type Development
While the routine development case led to uniform or only smoothly changing outcomes, a
radical non-monotonicity occurs in the results when the eureka type d velopment (uneven
adaptive speed enhancement) applies. C12 p rforms very much better than C in  certain
parameter range (Figure 5), so Hypothesis 1 is at least partly justified for non-routine
development tasks. Surprisingly, the range where C12 is b tter is quite narrow; the
advantages come only in case of modestly rapid market change (Mstab = 30). However, in
this parameter setting C12 is much better in most of the cases.
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Table 3: Profit Ratios, Eureka Development Task
Mstab
Tdist 10 20 30 40 50 60
5 0.64 0.86 2.01 0.96 0.95 0.97
10 0.80 0.86 1.57 0.9 0.93 0.95
15 0.69 0.83 1.37 0.86 0.9 0.93
20 0.65 0.84 1.13 0.83 0.88 0.91
25 0.68 0.83 1.04 0.8 0.86 0.91
30 0.67 0.82 1.02 0.79 0.86 0.90
Mstab
Tdist















              Figure 5: Eureka Development Task
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What is the explanation of the peak in Figure 5? If market conditions change ofte
(Mstab is 10-20), then dual supply has no time to achieve its potential advantage
since S1 and S2 always diverge in the early phase of adaptation. Therefore, single
supply is better. If, on the contrary, market stability is very high (Mstab is 40-60)
then the transitory effects of different adaptation routes are immaterial. Both
cooperations assume close-to-maximum profit most of the time, consequently the
gap between their performances gradually goes away (Table 3). But between slow
and very fast market change, there is a range where, on the one hand, C12 has enough
time to enjoy the returns of extra search efforts, on the other hand, a single supplier
has still not enough time to appr ach IP. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is partly justified in
case of non-routine development tasks: modestly rapid market change is
advantageous for dual supply. Hypothesis 2 (on the effects of market stability) is
also supported for the cases of modestly rapid and slow market change: the former
supports C12, the latter is better for C. However, Hypothesis 2 is falsified for
extremely fast market change (Mstab < 30), then single supply performs better
(Table 1).
The difference between the two cooperations’ performance strongly depends on
the timing of production: the later it begins (the lower Tdist is), the bigger C12’s
advantage at medium market stability. The reason for this is that low Tdist values
behave like a filter, they cut out production in the early phase of adaptation. In this
early period, S1 and S2 are still involved in specialization and stay apart from each
other (Figure 2b), and therefore they have no chance to yield profit. So, a strict
tolerance limit does not kill any opportunity for C12. But, C could have a chance to
produce some profit even in this early phase, since the single supplier moves steadily
toward IP (Figure 2a). A strict production tolerance limit (low Tdist) kills this first
mover opportunity, increasing the relative advantage of C12 over C. In other words,
dual supply is especially favored under a tight quality regime, when production does
not start until competencies have a close fit with product requirements. This finding
justifies Hypothesis 3 for modestly rapid market change: single supply’s
disadvantage lessens with widening tolerance limits. Again, the effect of tolerance
distance is not significant if market change is slow or extremely rapid (Table 1).
In the introduction we noted that for strategic reasons of avoiding pure price
competition, suppliers may try to avoid offering identical skill combinations (supply
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differentiation). We repeated the simulation with the eureka type pattern adding a
braking mechanism that keeps suppliers apart if their distance goes below a certain
limit. As a result, the advantage of C12 over C became a few percent less, but no
significant qualit tive difference occurred in the outcomes (see Figure 7 in the
Appendix). Therefore, we neglect this condition of minimum supply differentiation in
the rest of the paper.
3.2 Different User and Supplier Speed
After finishing the testing of hypotheses, we analyzed in more detail the range of
conditions under which dual supply turned out to be much better. We fix market
stability (Mstab) at 30, where the “peak” occurs in Figure 5, and add a new
sensitivity analysis parameter: the agents’ relative peed. Until now, we assumed
that supplier and user have the same adaptive speed at the same distance from their
respective targets. However, this equality can not be taken for granted. While
suppliers elaborate on production competencies, user develops a specific skill, the
ability to absorb supplier outputs. These two learning processes fundamentally
differ, including possibly their speeds. How sensitive are the results discussed in the
previous sections to the partners' relative speeds? We made a sensitivity analysis
assigning different adaptive weights to user and supplier speeds (VU and VS). These
weights reflect the magnitude of agents’ adaptive efforts or capabilities. A new
variable is defined as the quotient of the two weights:Speed ratio = VU : VS. If
Speed ratio > 1 then user's maximum speed is the higher and vice versa.
Is the outstanding advantage of C12 at medium market stability (Figure 5)
sensitive to agents’relative speed? The new sensitivity analysis addressed two
parameters, Tdist and Speed ratio. Now, Mstab was set to 30, the value at which
C12 performed superbly earlier. Table 4 and Figure 6 show the results.
7
                                            
7 Note that the seventh column of Table 4 is (partly) about the same parameter settings as
the third column of Table 3 (where Spe d Ratio = 1 by default). However, the numerical
results show some variability. This is due the fact that agents’ goal perception is random
within their perception error range. Variability is the biggest, cc. 12%, if tolerance
distance is the smallest (Tdis = 5); then, utility production begins only when agents get
very close to IP, and so the effects of randomness in perception cannot completely
smoothen out in the short productive periods.
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Table 4: Profit Ratios, Eureka Development (Mstab = 30)
     
  Speed Ratio






















Figure 6: Different User and Supplier Speeds
(Eureka Development, Mstab = 30)
Surprisingly, dual supply’s advantage turns out to be almost the smallest at similar
supplier and user speed weights, that is, in the case tested in 3.1.2 (Figure 6). To
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learn more about the nature of the local minimum at Speed ratio = 1, we repeated
the sensitivity test assuming a bit more volatile market structure (Ms ab = 20). Now,
the results of the new sensitivity run were slightly worse for C12, but again, the same
qualitative outcome occurred: there is a pit in the result curves when Speed ratio= 1.
What explanation can be given for this steady local minimum?
The answer lies in the fact that cooperations only yield high profit if quality and
efficiency are combined: suppliers approach IP and user gets close to its suppliers.
Developmental efforts have to be synchronized, and it is the presence or the lack of
synchronization that accounts for the zigzags in Figure 6:
If Speed ratio < 1 then suppliers are faster than users. This is not a problem for
C12 (at least when Speed ratio is not extremely low). Since suppliers make detours in
the early phase of adaptation, a bit lower user speed only means that user does not
arrive "too early" to its meeting with S1 and S2 at IP. The partners get close to each
other and to IP approximately at the same time; then, C12 produces high profit.
Meanwhile, single supplier S and its user aim without detours at IP. S's and U's
trajectories are of about the same length on average. Ther fore, when S reaches the
ideal point the slower U is usually still not there (quality without efficiency). This
delay brings victory to C12. Multiple supply's advantage is the highest at Speed ratio
= 0.5 (VU is the half of VS). The advantage vanishes gradually at lower Speed ratio
values, because an extremely slow user is almost equally bad for both single and
dual supply (Figure 6). As a result, the two performances become equally poor when
Speed ratio is about 0.1.
Speed ratio = 1. Now, the movements of single supplier and its user are syn-
chronized: with equal path length, equal speed entails equal arrival time at IP. The
relative performance of C to C12 improves, so Profit ratio decreases. This explains
the dip at Speed ratio = 1 in Figure 6.
If Speed ratio > 1 then users "run ahead". Suppliers are slow, causing efficiency
problems in both forms of cooperations. But still, the advantage of C12 over C
increases somewhat. A possible explanation is that the different supplier trajectories
in C12 double the chance that at least one of the suppliers gets sufficiently close to
the randomly moving IP, making the cooperation productive. Note that there is a
relative speed value (2) beyond which users become so much faster than suppliers
that they all reach IP at a very early phase of the adaptation process. From this
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point, an even higher supplier speed (a further increase in Speed ratio) does not
make a differenc  in the outcome. Hence the explanation for the plateau on the right
hand side of Figure 6.
Table 5: Cumulated Profits and Profit Ratios
(a) Tdist = 5        Speed Ratio
0.5 1.0 1.5
Profit C1 47 200 166
Profit C12 235 464 506
Profit Ratio C12/C1 4.94 2.32 3.05
(b) Tdist = 10        Speed Ratio
0.5 1.0 1.5
Profit C1 73 351 287
Profit C12 277 566 598
Profit Ratio C12/C1 3.80 1.61 2.08
(c) Tdist = 15        Speed Ratio
0.5 1.0 1.5
Profit C1 99 491 388
Profit C12 339 673 685
Profit Ratio C12/C1 3.41 1.37 1.77
(b) Tdist = 20        Speed Ratio
0.5 1.0 1.5
Profit C1 158 680 550
Profit C12 417 786 783
Profit Ratio C12/C1 2.63 1.16 1.42
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The simulation runs measured the relative performance of the two forms of
cooperations with the ratio of cumulative profits. The Profit ratio parameter tells
which cooperation is better in a certain setting, but it does not give information how
successful these cooperations are in absolute terms. Maybe the winning form of
cooperation is only the better of two poorly performing nes. To get more
information on this, we partially repeated the relative speed analysis displayed in
Figure 6, collecting now information on the absolute profits produced by C an  C12.
We focused on three representative speed ratio values (0.5, 1.0, 1.5), that is, when
user's speed weight was lower, equal and higher than the respective supplier speed
weight.
Table 5 reveals that the absolute cumulative profits decrease strictly monoto-
nically with narrowing production tolerance limits (Tdist) in both forms of
cooperation. This is just what one expects. However, it also turns out that C's
production falls much more steeply with narrowing tolerance limits. That is, the
outstanding advantage of dual sourcing at strict production tolerance limits is caused
by the very poor performance of single sourcing.
4. Discussion
4.1 What We Have Learned
The main research issue was to clarify that under which conditions dual supply is
better than single supply and vice versa, when we focus on issues of learning and
innovation. We described the external conditions by three variables. The first
descriptor, the kind of the product development task, was dichotomic: routine and
high novelty (eureka) type developments were compared. The second described the
pace of market change (Mstab). The third variable, Tdist, was about the minium
level of preparation before joint production starts (in terms of distance between the
agents, and between the agents and the ideal point). Later, a fourth variable was
added to refl ct differences in the strength of adaptive efforts, yielding difference in
adaptive speed (Speed ratio).
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We performed a series of sensitivity analyses with the first three variables (external
conditions). We proposed three ceteris paribus hypotheses, which indicate opposing
effects. Our goal was to mix conditions to see what the net outcome of opposing ef-
fects would be. We wanted to see which hypotheses dominate under which
conditions. The first hypothesis (H1) claimed that single supply is better for routine
tasks, and vice versa. The second hypothesis (H2) stated the faster the market
change, the better this is for dual supply. The third hypothesis (H3) claimed that
single supply fits better to loose product requirements and vice versa.
The results on routine type development tasks were the following (Table 1). The
simulations indicate that these developments favor single supply (H1 is j stified).
However, dual supply proved inferior to single supply under rapid market change (H2 is
not supported), and the strictness of production requirements had only a very weak
effect on the outcomes (H3 i  not supported).
In case of eureka type developments, H1 predicts that dual supply is better. But,
according to H2, single supply is favored when market change is slow (Mstab is
high). Thus, the simulation results support H2 and falsify H1 for slow market change.
However, because of the non-monotonicity of the resulting Profit ratio function
(Figure 5), the dichotomic distinction in H2’s wording between “slow” and “rapid”
change had to be refined: the latter category has been split to “modestly rapid” and
“extremely rapid”. With this modifications in place, we could claim that H1 and H2
are justified for modestly rapid market change (dual supply is better). However, if
change is extremely rapid, then single supply is preferred, falsifying both H1 and H2.
As far as H3 is concerned, tight production requirements clearly favor dual supply if
market change is modestly rapid, but is H3 not supported for cases of slow and
extremely fast change.
The simulation results suggest that several factors have to coincide for dual
supply to be more profitable. One would expect C12 to be superior when learning is
important, that is, when conditions are unstable. However, beyond some point,
increasing instability eliminates the advantage: the extra search efforts of S1 and S2
provide extra advantage only if market conditions leave time for it. Moreover,
possessing superb skills is only a necessary, not a sufficient condition for success:
still more time is needed to harvest the yields of perfection. But, if this harvesting
time is too long, then finally the single supplier even as a late comer also reaches the
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same level of perfection. So, very slow change in market conditions deprives C12's
extra knowledge from its advantage. Industrial users who intend to involve multiple
suppliers have to consider if technology and consumer taste would not change
significantly before they finish product development and reach reasonable returns.
Furthermore, if the change in external conditions is very rare, then producers with
multiple suppliers should look for other markets after a while, because their extra
production knowledge will become the standard for all participants in the old market.
Users with multiple suppliers also have to estimate the minimal "state of rea-
diness" of product development at which production may begin. In case of low
quality expectations, the production tolerance limit (Tdist) is large, and it is to a
great extent up to the producer when to begin sales. Under such conditions, one can
make profit manufacturing half baked products, and again, having specialized
suppliers is less important. But this strategy does not work in case of high-tech
goods. For example: the first market entry of digital photo-cameras in the eighties
was a total failure because of low picture quality.
The differentiation of user and supplier speeds of adaptation (VU nd VS) reflected
differences in adaptive efforts or capabilities in the model. The simulation r sults
indicate that C12's relative advantage over C can be amplified if users' speed is about the
half of suppliers’ speed (at the same distance from IP). The absorption of supplier
outputs is a non-trivial task; production lines have to be set up, routine procedures have
to be reshaped, etc. Because of organizational inertia, this process may take time
(Hannan and Freeman, 1989): the necessary duration of users' adjustment varies over
industries and possibly also over firm sizes. The simulation results show that the
optimal user adaptive speeds are different in the single and in the dual supply cases. A
user with one supplier has to be very keen to go on at a similar pace as its partner to
avoid efficiency problems. But the same (low) user speed is not so harmful for
cooperations with two suppliers that are delayed by their initial specializing efforts
anyhow. Then, a bit slow user may still finish its adaptation to the ideal product
requirements in time.
Note that a limitation of the given representation is that agents always follow the
actual ideal point position, that is, they go for the product which the best in market
terms. In reality, there may remain some residual demand for obsolete products, and
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firms may go on with their production for a while. Therefore, the present simulation
model mainly applies to conditions under which the viability of old products is low.
4.2 Methodological Remarks
Simulation requires artful simplification. Eliminating factors may help to concentrate
on the focal questions, but eliminating too many factors radically narrows down the
model's applicability (Burton and Obel, 1995). Adding too many components to the
model causes serious interpretation problems: if some effects support a certain
outcome while others tend to suppress it, the superposition of the pros and cons may
hide the underlying regularities. Therefore, we opted to start with only a handful of
effects and see if the outcomes show resemblance to reality. We acted like a radio
amateur that fine-tunes the switche , listening if (s)he hears some clear voice in the
noise. The accidental choice of some model parameters involved in empirical testing
of the model against reality was senseless prior to our investigation. But now the
qualitative results obtained indicate the design of an empirical test: to check if the
simulation model generates significant outcomes observable in the organizational
universe (Carley, 1992).
An important issue in modeling is the robustness of the results. We tested the
variability of numerical findings between different runs with the same parameter
configurations in several cases, and found 5-15% variance. The variance is caused
by the built-in randomness of the model, and this effect can be diminished by more
extended simulation times. Computational capacity still being somewhat of a scarce
resource (nowadays on the side of the researcher more than on the side of the
computer), we faced the old methodological dilemma: applying extra long runs on a
few parameter settings versus testing the model with shorter runs but on a much
broader parameter range. To couple search breadth with tolerably small variance
range, we opted for 5000 steps as a compromise. Test runs revealed that even three-
four times longer runs would not add to much to our knowledge: the curves that
depict the relative performance of the two forms of cooperation get somewhat




Brittain, J. W. and J. Freeman (1980), "Organizational Proliferation and Density 
Dependent Selection," in. J. R. Kimberly and R. H. Miles (Eds.), Organizational 
Life Cycle, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, California.
Burton, R. M. and B. Obel (1995), “The Validity of Computational Models in
Organization Science: From Model Realism to Purpose of the Model,” 
Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, 1(1), 57-71.
Carley, K. ( 1992), "Organizational Learning and Personnel Turnover," 
Organization Science,3(1), February.
Cohen, W. M. and D. A. Levinthal (1990), "Absorptive Capacity: A New 
Perspective on Innovation and Learning,"  Administrative Science Quarterly, 35, 
128-152.
Dearborn, D. C. and H. A. Simon (1958), "Selective Perception: A Note on the 
Identification of Executives," Sociometry, 21, 140-144.
Freeman, J. and M. T. Hannan (1983), “Niche Width and the Dynamics of 
Organizational Populations,” American Journal of Sociology,  88, 1116-1145.
Hakansson, H. (1986), Industrial Technological Developments. A Network
Approach. Croom-Helm, London, UK.
Hamel, G. (1991), "Competition for Competence and Interpartner Learning within 
International Strategic Alliance," Strategic Management Journal, 12, 83-103.
Hannan, M. T. and J. Freeman (1989), Organizational Ecology. Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Helper, S. (1991), "Strategy and Irreversibility in Supplier Relations: The Case of 
the US Automobile Industry," Business History Review, 65, 781-824.
Eaton, B. C. and R. G. Lipsey (1989), "Product Differentiation," in. R. Schmalensee
and R. D. Willing (Eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, North-Holland, 
Amsterdam.
Kahneman, D., P. Slovic and A. Tversky (Eds.) (1982), Judgment Under
Uncertainty. Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
UK.
Lamming, R. (1993), Beyond Partnership. Prentice Hall, New York.
33
Levinthal, D. and J. G. March (1981), "A Model of Adaptive Organizational 
Search," Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization. 2, 207-333.
March, J. G. (1991), "Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning,"
Organization Science, 2(1), February.
Nooteboom, B. (1992), "Towards a Dynamic Theory of Transactions," Journal of 
Evolutionary Economics, 2, 281-299.
Nooteboom, B. (1994), "Architecture of a Learning Based Model of Transactions 
for Supplier-User Relations," paper presented at the conference of the J. A. 
Schumpeter Society, Münster, Germany.
Nooteboom, B. (1995), "Towards a Learning Based Model of Transactions," in: J. 
Groenewegen (Ed.), TCE and Beyond, Kluwer, Deventer, The Netherlands.
Nooteboom, B. (1966a), "Trust, Opportunism and Governance: a Process and 
Control Model", Organization Studies, 17(6), 985-1010.
Nooteboom, B., (1996b), "Towards a Cognitive Theory of the Firm," Research 
School SOM, P.O. Box 800, 9700 AV Groningen, The Netherlands.
Nooteboom, B. (1997), "Cost, Quality and Learning Based Governance of 
Transactions", in: M. Colombo (Ed.): The Changing Boundaries of the Firm. 
London: Routledge, 1997, forthcoming.
Nonaka, I. (1991), "The Knowledge Creating Company," Harv rd Business Review,
96-104.
Peirce, C. S. (1957), Essays in the Philosophy of Science. Indianapolis, Bobbs-
Merrill.
Péli, G. (1997), “The Niche Hiker’s Guide to Population Ecology: A Logical 
Reconstruction of Organization Ecology’s Niche Theory,” Sociological
Methodology (forthcoming).
Péli, G. and M. Masuch (1997), "The Logic of Propagation Strategies: Axiomatizing
a Fragment of Organizational Ecology in First-Order Logic," O ganization 
Science (forthcoming).
Péli, G. and B. Nooteboom (1995), "Learning to Cooperate: The Simulation of
Transaction Costs in Supplier-User Relations," paper presented at the
Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory Workshop, Los 
Angeles.
34
Podolny, J. (1994), “Market Uncertainty and the Social Character of Economic 
Exchange,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 39, 548-483.
Pólos, L. (1995), “Towards the Metaphysics of Organizations,” Technical report. 
CCSOM, University of Amsterdam.
Prahalad, C. K. and G. Hamel (1990), "The Core Competences of the Corporation,"
Harvard Business Review, 79-90.
Schrader, S. (1991), "Informal Technology Transfer Between Firms, Cooperation 
Through Information Trading," Research Policy, 20, 153-170.
Richmond, K., M. Newcomb, K. Chichakly, J. Gäss, D. Stephens and V. Kerschner 
(1992), Stella II. Tutorial and Technical Documentation, High Performance 
Systems Inc., Hannover, Germany.
Teece, D. J. (1986), "Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for 
Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy," Resear h Policy, 15, 
285-305.
Thompson, J. D. (1967), Organizations in Action. McGraw-Hill, New York.
Walker, G. (1985), "Network Position and Cognition in a Computer Software Firm."
Administrative Science Quarterly, 30, 103-130.
Williamson, O. E. (1975), Markets and Hierarchies. Analysis and Antitrust 
Implications. Free Press, New York.
Williamson, O. E. (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Firms, 




















Figure 7: Eureka Development with Supply Differentiation
(Sdist = 3)
Note: Sdist is the minimal distance between suppliers in a competence dimension.
We list some important equations of the model. The complete code is available from
the authors upon request in Stella II (Macintosh) format.
The ideal point’s move is punctuated and random. The variable "movex" generates
the random shift of IP along axis x whenever a given time period, Mstab, has been
elapsed.
1. IPx(t) = IPx(t - dt) + (movex) * dt
IPipercS is the ideal point’s i coordinate as it is perceived by supplier S. It is
calculated by adding an error component to the de facto ideal point coordinate.
The perception error range is the product of the error magnitude (err) and the
distance between S and IP along dimension i, DistSiIPi. Within the error range, the
perceived position is chosen randomly.
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2. IPipercS = IPi + random(-1,1) * err * DistSiIPi
Single supplier trajectory. Si moves towards the perceived position of IPi. VSi is
single supplier's speed along axis i. The speed increases as IPi is approached (with
a built in smoothing mechanism to filter out oscillation around the target). The
pattern of VSi change reflects either routine or eureka type development tasks
(Figure 1). User’s coordinates (with single supplier), Ui, are calculated similarly
to that of the single supplier (3,4).
3. Si(t) = Si(t - dt) + (VSi) * dt
4. Ui(t) = Ui(t - dt) + (VUi) * dt
Profits. The cumulated profit is stock that aggregates the profits obtained from the
cooperation during the simulation period (5). The profit component produced by
the user, ProfitU, is multiplied with the profit component of the supplier that comes
from its adjustment to IP (6). If one component is zero, then no profit is produced:
the partners cannot produce alone.
5. Cum_Profit(t) = Cum_Profit(t - dt) + (Profit) * dt
6. Profit = ProfitU * ProfitS
If the user-supplier distance, DistUS, exceeds the tolerance limit, Tdist, then no
profit obtains because of efficiency problems (7); if the supplier-IP distance,
DistIPS, exceeds Tdist, then no profit obtains because of quality problems (8).
Within the tolerance limit, profit components are linearly decreasing functions of
the agents’distance from their respective targets (7,8).
7. ProfitU = if DistUS > Tdist  then  0  else  (1 - DistUS/Tdist)
8. ProfitS = if DistIPS > Tdist  then  0  else  (1 - DistIPS/Tdist)
In case of two suppliers, the average of their profits are calculated. Moreover, one
supplier can take over the inactive supplier’s place partially. The ratio of 
production take-over (variable “Substitution”) decreases linearly with the
dissimilarity of their competencies (S1 - S2 distance).
9. Substitution = if DistS1S2 < 100  then 1 - DistS1S2/100  else 0
